India at the Crossroads: Demography, Polarisation and Global Credibility

India’s trajectory over the next decade will be shaped by the collision of two facts that many outside and inside the country find hard to reconcile. On one hand, India is a rising great power: large economy, nuclear state, expanding technological base, and growing geopolitical influence. On the other hand, it faces enormous internal fragility — deep inequality, governance stresses, rising majoritarian politics under the BJP–RSS ecosystem, widening mistrust among religious minorities, resurgent separatist demands in regions from Ladakh to the Northeast, and a worsening global image as Indians abroad confront pushback for perceived alignment with controversial foreign policies (including alignment with Israel in the Gaza crisis).

The popular figure you quoted — 800 million below the poverty line — is not supported by the World Bank’s recent account of extreme poverty; nonetheless, vast vulnerabilities persist in employment quality, social protection, and regional inequality even as extreme poverty declined in recent years. This duality — rising global influence and deep domestic fragility — creates a high-stakes puzzle: how will India govern and project power without undermining the social compact on which legitimacy depends?

This analysis unpacks the key drivers (demography and economy, political ideology and polarisation, social cohesion and minorities, separatist pressures, diaspora and global perception) and lays out three plausible scenarios for India’s near-term future, with recommended policy priorities for Indian and international actors.

1. The empirical baseline: demography, poverty and the economy

Two linked facts dominate India’s strategic profile.

First, India’s demographic weight: more than 1.4 billion people, a still-young population in many regions, and large cohorts entering working age. Demographics are often presented as a “dividend,” but only if jobs, health, and education scale in step.

Second, recent data show sharp reductions in extreme poverty but persistent vulnerabilities in employment and inequality. The World Bank’s India poverty brief (2025) documents a large fall in extreme poverty from earlier decades and highlights progress in lifting people out of the most acute deprivation — a real achievement. But poverty reduction statistics mask uneven outcomes: informality remains dominant, many workers are underemployed or in precarious gig-economy roles, and social protection coverage is incomplete. In short: India has fewer people in extreme poverty than before, but large vulnerable populations remain exposed to shocks, unemployment, and rising living costs — fertile ground for social and political instability if growth falters.

Implication: the simple slogan “India rising” is only half the story. Economic growth has created headline numbers and global market interest, but without faster job-rich industrialisation, better public services, and targeted poverty alleviation, the political costs of inequality will grow.

2. Political transformation: BJP, RSS and the politics of identity

Since 2014 the BJP, aligned ideologically with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — a social-political movement promoting a majoritarian Hindu nationalist worldview — has reshaped Indian politics. The BJP’s electoral dominance and cultural project have altered public institutions, political language, and state behaviour.

Human-rights and democracy monitors document worrying trends: restrictions on civic space, harassment of journalists and critics, discriminatory policing, and policies that disproportionately affect religious minorities. Freedom House and Human Rights Watch cite a decline in democratic norms and increased state action that targets minority communities and civil society actors. These documented trends are more than narrative: they are empirically visible shifts in governance and institutional behaviour.

Political consequence: majoritarian politics consolidates an “us vs them” frame. That frame produces two structural risks. First, institutional capture — where watchdogs, law enforcement, and bureaucracy are perceived as partisan rather than neutral. Second, social alienation — where millions of religious and cultural minorities feel insecure and excluded. Both dynamics erode the national consensus necessary for stable governance.

3. Social cohesion under pressure: minorities, migration and public safety

Reports from rights organizations and investigative outlets show a pattern: increased communal incidents, “bulldozer actions” ostensibly targeting illegal structures in the name of law enforcement, and civic restrictions that disproportionately affect Muslims and other minorities. Amnesty and HRW document examples where state actions targeted minority communities and civic groups. These patterns produce an existential insecurity among minorities — which is in turn a recipe for reciprocal distrust and social fragmentation.

At the same time, migration — internal and external — complicates the social picture. Rapid urbanisation concentrates grievances in poorly serviced cities and peri-urban settlements. Political entrepreneurs profit from these grievances by framing migrants, minorities, or outsiders as threats. Such frames are politically potent and can lead to cycles of violence or selective state repression.

Implication: social cohesion is not just a moral issue; it is strategic. Eroded trust between communities makes any grand development push harder to implement and raises the spectre of sustained low-grade unrest or episodic communal conflagrations.

4. Separatist pressures: the long tail of unresolved national questions

India is not a single-story polity. Beneath its maps of growth and GDP headlines lie dozens of unresolved local grievances — historical, ethnic, economic and environmental — that periodically become violent, politically explosive, and geopolitically consequential. These are not isolated “law-and-order” problems. They are structural fractures that, if mishandled, will degrade India’s internal cohesion and external standing for decades.

Below is a senior-analyst level unpacking: historical context, proximate drivers, regional case studies, how these movements internationalize, security consequences, plausible future scenarios, and a prioritized menu of practical policy responses.

Why separatism matters strategically

Even if wholesale secession is unlikely across most of India, separatist and autonomy movements matter because they:

• Fragment state capacity (security and governance resources get diverted).
• Create political instability that scares investment and undermines reform.
• Offer rivals (state and non-state) openings to project influence across India’s periphery.
• Produce humanitarian and rights crises that attract international scrutiny and delegitimize Delhi.

Put bluntly: unresolved subnational conflicts are strategic vulnerabilities — they shrink India’s margins for external strategy and make domestic unity more brittle.

Historical background — a quick primer

India’s diversity includes hundreds of languages, multiple legal pluralities, and long-standing regional identities. Since independence, the state has accommodated some demands (linguistic states, devolution programs) and suppressed others (military responses in Kashmir, emergency-era centralization). Several insurgencies have waxed and waned across time — from the Naga struggle and Assam agitations to Naxalite/Maoist unrest and the long-running Kashmir conflict. That long tail of unfinished business forms the context for today’s flashpoints.

Core drivers — why movements flare up now

1. Political marginalisation and governance failure
   Local elites and communities who feel bypassed by development or excluded from power are susceptible to mobilisation. Corrupt or extractive local governance amplifies grievances.
2. Economic exclusion and poverty
   Regions rich in resources (minerals, forests) but poor in outcomes (jobs, schools) often radicalise when local populations feel benefits are siphoned elsewhere.
3. Identity and demographic shifts
   Ethnic majorities in a state may fear loss of status from migration, resettlement, or deliberate demographic engineering — a potent mobiliser (as seen in parts of the Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir).
4. Environmental stress and resource competition
   Climate shocks, land degradation, water scarcity and resource grabs (dams, mines) produce displacements that fuel grievance.
5. State repression and human-rights violations
   Heavy-handed security responses, collective punishments, and impunity for abuses create cycles of radicalisation.
6. Sanctuary & porous borders
   Geographies with porous borders (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan) allow insurgents to find sanctuaries, access weapons, or sustain supply lines.
7. Diaspora funding & transnational networks
   Some movements gain money, publicity or political lobbying through sympathetic diaspora communities abroad.
8. Digital radicalisation and information warfare
   Encrypted messaging, social media echo chambers, and misinformation accelerate mobilisation and harden narratives.

Regional case studies (concise but revealing)

Kashmir & the trans-Himalayan space

• Roots: historical dispute with Pakistan, contested accession in 1947, long cycles of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
• Recent triggers: the 2019 abrogation of Article 370, large security deployments, restrictions on political activity and communications.
• Risk vectors: internationalisation (UN/ICJ attention), proxy support narratives from Pakistan, continued alienation and youth radicalisation.
• Consequence: Kashmir remains the most geopolitically sensitive single locus of separatist pressure.

Northeast (Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Mizoram, Tripura)

• Roots: ethnic pluralism, colonial-era boundaries, delayed integration and economic neglect.
• Recent triggers: ethnic violence (e.g., Manipur outbreaks), citizenship/legal anxieties (NRC/CAA spillovers), perceived majoritarian encroachment.
• Complication: several armed groups with cross-border sanctuaries; China and Myanmar fragility add strategic risk.
• Consequence: sustained low-intensity conflict, refugee flows, and cross-border geopolitical competition.

Central India: Naxal / Maoist insurgency

• Roots: extreme inequality, land dispossession, adivasi marginalisation, weak state presence.
• Recent triggers: mining/industrial projects without local consent, poor law enforcement and development gaps.
• Consequence: a persistent security drain across a wide territorial belt — more insurgent than secessionist in ideology, but destabilising nonetheless.

Ladakh & other Himalayan peripheries

• Roots: long-standing local identity demands, neglect, and new strategic infrastructure change.
• Recent triggers: demands for statehood, perceived demographic/administrative marginalisation, and rapid militarisation after 2020 border clashes with China.
• Consequence: local unrest can be amplified by external border tensions, making calm fragile.

Gorkhaland, Khalistan (diaspora dimension) and pockets elsewhere

Consequence: diaspora funding and political lobbying can keep old movements alive; these are reputational and diplomatic flashpoints.

Roots: ethnic/regional identity claims (Gorkha, Sikh separatism historically) — Khalistan strongest in diaspora politics; Gorkhaland recurrent in West Bengal hills.

Plausible futures (three scenarios)

A — Accommodation and integration (best case)

Delhi pursues realistic political settlements: negotiated autonomy, economic inclusion, culturally sensitive development, demilitarization and truth-and-reconciliation mechanisms. Local capacities grow, grievances shrink, insurgency fades.

Enablers: political will, smart devolution, major development push with local control.

Probability: Low–medium, but achievable in selected hotspots.

B — Managed conflict (most likely)

Combination of targeted development, periodic security operations, and limited political concessions. Violence persists intermittently; the state contains but does not fully resolve grievances. Externalisation continues at low levels.

Enablers: mixed policy toolkit; costs steady but contained.

Probability: Medium–high.

C — Escalation & fragmentation (tail risk)

Multiple regions ignite concurrently, heavy repression fuels radicalisation, external patrons deepen support, insurgent safe havens expand and India’s international standing suffers. Conflicts become long-running and open up geopolitical competition in India’s periphery.

Enablers: economic shock, political polarisation, heavy-handed crackdowns, major external backing.

Probability: Low but non-negligible if triggers align.

5. Foreign policy posture and global perception: India’s Israel turn and its costs

India’s tilt toward Israel under the Modi government has produced tangible strategic benefits — deepening defence, intelligence and technology ties that are attractive to a state with high security and technical ambitions. But these gains are asymmetric: they strengthen specific capabilities while eroding India’s broader diplomatic capital, especially among Muslim-majority states, parts of the Global South, and sections of India’s own diaspora. As a result, India’s ability to claim neutral moral leadership — to mediate, to mobilize the Global South, to exercise soft power — is at risk. The net strategic picture is now more transactional and less reputational.

What India gains from deepening Israel ties

1. Defence & technology transfers. Israel is a leading provider of drones, missile-defence systems, cyber tools and surveillance technology. For India — which seeks to modernize its military and acquire niche technologies quickly — Israel offers tested, battlefield-proven systems and co-development partnerships. These ties have accelerated India’s acquisition of ISR, drone and missile-defence capabilities.
2. Intelligence co-operation. Shared threats (terror networks, surveillance targets) have driven deeper ISI-Mossad/RAW-Mossad-style cooperation frameworks, improving tactical counterterrorism and technical intelligence exchange. This operational value is immediate and visible to Delhi.
3. Economic & investment linkages. Recent investment accords and bilateral treaties (including the September 2025 investment deal and related memoranda) open channels for capital, tech start-ups, agri-tech, water-management and cybersecurity partnerships. These can boost high-value manufacturing and innovation ecosystems in India.
4. Diplomatic reciprocity. Israel has publicly supported India on sensitive security questions (for example in international forums when India faces criticism), creating a reciprocal political cushion that Delhi values.

These are real dividends. For a government focused on rapid capability upgrades and a secure supply of advanced systems, Israel is a reliable, willing partner.

Where the costs show up — reputational, regional and diplomatic

1. Erosion of moral and mediator currency.
   India historically enjoyed a reputation in much of the Global South and the Muslim world as a non-aligned, sympathetic partner to Palestinian aspirations. Perceived tilt toward Israel — particularly during acute humanitarian crises in Gaza — undermines India’s claim to impartiality. That reduces New Delhi’s ability to act as convener or honest broker in the Middle East and in broader Global South coalitions. Domestic abstentions or carefully worded diplomatic statements have not fully neutralized the perception that India sides with Israel.
2. Strained soft power among Muslim publics and states.
   Muslim-majority countries and constituencies — from Indonesia and Malaysia to parts of the Gulf and North Africa — take public positions on Palestine seriously. India’s perceived sympathy for Israel risks alienating large constituencies (including diaspora communities and economic partners), complicating cultural diplomacy and people-to-people ties. Protests and critical voices within India itself (religious leaders, civil society) demonstrate domestic costs of perceived alignment.
3. Neighbourhood and regional politics.
   India’s Israel tilt feeds into anxieties among neighbours that Delhi’s foreign policy is less about regional balance and more about transactional alignment with far-off partners. This matters because neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives) now hedge toward alternative patrons — notably China — when Delhi’s regional rhetoric appears uncompromising or insensitive.
4. Diplomatic vulnerability in multilateral fora.
   India’s abstentions or calibrated votes on UN resolutions relating to Israel/Palestine are noticed and can reduce the willingness of many countries to side with India in other multilateral disputes. That reciprocity problem undermines India’s broader multilateral ambitions — from seeking permanent Security Council influence to leading Global South coalitions.
5. Diaspora tensions and domestic backlash abroad.
   Indian diasporic activism that mirrors Delhi’s foreign policy can provoke counter-mobilisations and create local security and reputational problems in host countries. These flashpoints damage soft power and complicate bilateral relationships (where host governments must respond to public order and political pressure).
6. Strategic overhang with other partners (Gulf balancing).
   India’s economic and labour dependence on the Gulf tempers outright alienation, but political moves (or perceptions thereof) can still create friction. Gulf states — pursuing their own hedges and new pacts (e.g., recent Saudi–Pakistan moves) — will weigh India’s regional posture when negotiating security and energy ties. Delhi must manage these trade-offs carefully.

Evidence the costs are already materializing (recent signals)

Analytical warnings: commentators and analysts across the region warn that India’s Israel turn risks being interpreted as choosing sides, diminishing its claim to non-alignment and Global South leadership. These analyses appear across think-tanks and regional media.

Investment plus controversy: India and Israel signed a bilateral investment deal in September 2025 even as criticism of Israel’s tactics in Gaza intensified — a move praised by some markets but criticised by human-rights advocates and parts of Indian civil society. That juxtaposition shows the transactional posture and the reputational tension it creates.

Metropolitan protests and political pushback in India: Domestic Muslim leaders and civil-society groups have publicly condemned India’s stance and called for clearer humanitarian positions — evidence that Delhi’s foreign policy choices are feeding domestic unrest and political criticism.

6. Diaspora dynamics and reverse soft-power

India’s global reach has long been amplified by its diaspora. Across continents the Indian community supplies remittances, creates business links, fills professional cadres in health and tech, and projects cultural influence through film, cuisine, religion and festivals. Historically that diaspora has been one of India’s most durable and undervalued strategic assets — a networked bridge linking Delhi to capitals and markets around the world.

But diaspora power is conditional. When the homeland’s politics harden and domestic polarisation is exported abroad, soft power can flip into a liability. Below I unpack the mechanics of that reversal, identify where it is happening, and recommend practical steps to recover positive diaspora influence.

A. How soft power flips into “reverse” soft power — the mechanics

1. Political exportation: When home-state political actors (parties, official embassies, or aligned cultural institutions) use diaspora channels to promote partisan narratives, host societies perceive the diaspora as an extension of foreign politics rather than as an integrated community. That perception triggers counter-mobilisation.
2. Mobilisation around homeland conflicts: Large humanitarian or geopolitical crises (e.g., Gaza) catalyse highly emotional diasporic activism. Where diaspora factions organise opposing rallies, local streets become arenas of homeland conflict — producing tensions, clashes, and bad headlines.
3. Nationalist lobbying and capture of institutions: Well-funded nationalist groups can gain access to universities, temples, charities, or media platforms in host countries and steer those institutions toward partisan activities, sometimes using foreign funding channels that lack transparency.
4. Backlash and securitisation: Host governments facing public disorder or foreign interference often respond with policing, surveillance, or legal scrutiny. That securitisation can stigmatise the broader community and chill genuine civic life.
5. Reputational spillover: Negative images — videos of street brawls, inflammatory speeches, or high-profile incidents — travel fast on social media and are seized by political actors, reducing goodwill toward India and complicating diplomatic ties.

B. Patterns observed (where and how this matter plays out)

• Large Western democracies (UK, US, Canada, Australia): Visible street protests and counters, parliamentary debates about foreign interference, and media cycles that highlight intra-diaspora conflict.
• Smaller European cities: Local tensions magnified when host societies have significant Muslim or other groups who view Indian policies (e.g., on minorities) as relevant to their own communities.
• Gulf states: State-sanctioned diaspora activity is common; here the risk is different — reputational friction is less visible, but politicised diaspora behaviour can strain labor/diplomatic relations.
• Global South hubs: Diaspora lobbying for business links can be undermined when political controversies at home spark protests that local governments interpret as external political meddling.

(These are broad patterns; the key point is not that every diaspora community is fractious but that pockets of aggressive, politicised activism create outsized reputational effects.)

C. Strategic costs to India

1. Loss of moral credibility: When diaspora activism is seen as defending controversial policies, it undermines India’s ability to claim the moral high ground on human-rights or pluralism.
2. Economic vulnerability: Bad publicity can translate into commercial hesitancy — from tourism dips to investor concern about political risk.
3. Diplomatic friction: Host governments field complaints from voters and opposition parties; embassies must repeatedly distance official India from diaspora behaviour, which is politically awkward.
4. Security dilemmas: Heavy-handed policing of diasporic protests can escalate into human-rights concerns and feed a cycle of grievance that benefits radical actors.

D. Policy prescriptions — what New Delhi should do

1. Depoliticise official diaspora outreach. Rebrand and re-tool cultural diplomacy so that Indian cultural centres, festivals and scholarships are explicitly non-partisan platforms focused on arts, education, and entrepreneurship.
2. Transparent funding rules. Publish clear, public rules for how government and quasi-governmental funds for diaspora groups are allocated; ensure grant processes are competitive and monitored.
3. Consular leadership on de-escalation. Train embassy/consulate staff in conflict mediation and rapid dialogue facilitation during protests; set up hotlines for local authorities to coordinate crowd-management that protects civic liberties.
4. Promote pluralism abroad. Fund programs that showcase India’s internal diversity — minority arts funds, interfaith dialogues, and scholarships for minority students — to counter monolithic narratives.
5. Public accountability. Where diaspora leaders cross legal lines (hate speech, incitement), publicly uphold the rule of law and, where appropriate, cooperate with host authorities to investigate — demonstrating India’s commitment to civic norms.

E. Policy prescriptions — what host governments should do

1. Enforce foreign-interference laws evenhandedly. Monitor and regulate foreign funding flows and political influence campaigns through transparent legislative frameworks (foreign agent reporting, charity audits).
2. Protect civic liberties while policing hate. Ensure policing responses to protests protect free speech but act decisively against incitement, violence, and foreign-backed malign influence.
3. Invest in community resilience. Fund local civil-society bridges, intercultural education, and municipal dialogue platforms that insulate communities from imported polarisation.
4. Engage embassies proactively. Use diplomatic channels to ask sending states to refrain from political mobilisation within host borders and to support integration programs.

F. Recommendations for diaspora leaders and organisations

1. Adopt codes of conduct. Civic organisations and temples should publish codes forbidding hate speech, endorsing non-violence, and committing to transparent funding.
2. Professionalise mediation. Build networks of faith leaders, community elders, and legal advisers who can rapidly mediate disputes and privately defuse flashpoints.
3. Shift narrative focus. Prioritise local integration projects — mentorship, social services, economic partnerships — that build goodwill and demonstrate the diaspora’s constructive role.
4. Partner with host civil society. Co-sponsor intercommunity festivals and issue-focused collaborations (health, education) with non-Indian NGOs to widen public support.

G. Operational measures & quick wins

• Rapid response protocol: Every Indian mission should have a “diaspora de-escalation” toolkit: a roster of community mediators, communication templates, and pre-agreed coordination lines with police and local councils.
• Transparency portal: A public online register of government grants to diaspora organisations, updated quarterly, to reduce rumors about opaque funding.
• Cultural ambassadors: Deploy short residencies of artists and scholars who explicitly showcase India’s pluralism (e.g., Muslim poets, Christian musicians, tribal artists) funded through non-partisan cultural budgets.
• Joint commissions: Host governments and India can create bilateral “diaspora commissions” that monitor tensions and propose joint community initiatives.

H. Long-term strategic framing

Diaspora soft power is not a static gift; it is a fragile resource that requires cultivation and restraint. In a globalised media environment, a handful of viral incidents can undo years of quiet goodwill. For India, the strategic path is to treat the diaspora as a public good that must be governed by transparent rules, inclusive narratives, and a consistent commitment to non-partisanship. For host countries, empowering local civic infrastructure that fosters integration will immunise societies against the negative spillovers of homeland polarisation.

7. Neighbourly anxiety: Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the region

India’s neighbours no longer see Delhi primarily as a benign hegemon or benevolent partner. Instead, many fear an assertive India that combines economic leverage, political pressure, and cultural majoritarianism — a mix that can translate into coercion. That perception is not merely emotional; it has strategic consequences: closer ties between India’s small neighbours and extra-regional powers (China, Gulf, Russia), declining willingness to cooperate bilaterally, and a regional diplomacy that is more transactional, suspicious and unstable.

Below I unpack why this shift is happening, how it manifests in three immediate cases (Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), the regional ripple effects, and what corrective options exist.

7.1) The mechanics of neighbour anxiety — how Indian domestic politics link to regional insecurity

Neighbourly fear of India is produced by three interacting mechanisms:

• Asymmetric dependence + coercion history. Repeated episodes where Delhi used trade restrictions, visa measures, or informal economic pressure to advance political aims have seeded mistrust. When large neighbours possess leverage — access to markets, remittance corridors, energy supplies — the mere hint of political friction produces outsized anxiety.

• Exported identity politics. When majoritarian domestic narratives (religious or cultural) gain state support at home, they are read abroad as signals of changing intent — i.e., protection of co-ethnic majorities could translate into pressure on kin-minorities or cross-border populations.

• Border ambiguities and unresolved disputes. Unsettled lines or new infrastructure projects that alter facts on the ground create flashpoints that neighbouring capitals view as deliberate tests of resolve.

These mechanisms combine to convert Indian domestic moves into regional security dilemmas: minor actions are amplified into existential concerns by neighbours who lack equivalent leverage.

7.2) Nepal — the Lipulekh/Kalapani flashpoint and political ripples

Recent years have seen a renewed Nepalese focus on the Lipulekh / Kalapani / Limpiyadhura border triangle. Kathmandu’s protests and diplomatic notes reflect long-running grievances that have been jolted by Indian infrastructure projects and map changes, which Nepal interprets as attempts to alter the status quo on the ground. These moves feed nationalist politics inside Nepal and create domestic pressure on its government to push back — sometimes by tilting toward Beijing for diplomatic support.

Why it matters strategically: Nepal sits between India and China; rising Sino-Nepal warming (diplomatic, economic) reduces India’s margin of manoeuvre in the Himalaya and creates a security belt that India must now treat as contested. If Delhi’s actions continue to be perceived as heavy-handed, Kathmandu’s balancing trend accelerates.

7.3) Bangladesh — humanitarian complexity, Rohingya politics, and bilateral trust

Bangladesh hosts one of the world’s largest refugee populations (Rohingya), and its domestic politics and economic calculus are tightly bound up with regional stability. Recent reporting and rights documentation show India has engaged in expulsions and detention of Rohingya that worry Dhaka — both on humanitarian grounds and because they complicate joint management of cross-border flows. Human-rights interventions alleging expulsions without protections have generated public and diplomatic pushback.

Strategic effect: Dhaka is sensitive to any Indian action that upsets a fragile status quo. When India appears to treat cross-border populations instrumentally, Bangladesh hedges — strengthening ties with China and other partners on trade and infrastructure, while becoming more reluctant to defer to New Delhi on security cooperation.

7.4) Sri Lanka — debt politics, Chinese influence and Indian impatience

Sri Lanka’s post-crisis trajectory underscores how neighbours react to perceived Indian assertiveness. Colombo’s heavy borrowing from China (and the Hambantota port lease episode) has produced a complex triad: Sri Lanka needs funds and partners, China offers capital, and India resents being side-lined or treated as second order. Recent renegotiations and Sri Lankan overtures to China and others show Colombo will exploit great-power competition to retain autonomy.

Why it matters: India’s inability to offer fast, large-scale economic alternatives leaves neighbours with rational incentives to diversify partnerships — weakening traditional Indian influence and increasing Beijing’s foothold in the Indian Ocean.

7.5) Regional systemic consequences — from hedging to fragmentation

The three bilateral cases above add up to a regional strategic pattern:

• Hedging intensifies: Smaller states seek multiple patrons — China for money, Russia for arms, Gulf states for energy and investment — reducing India’s exclusive sway.
• Transactional diplomacy: Expect more issue-by-issue alignments rather than durable strategic friendship with India. Cooperation becomes contingent, reversible, and heavily negotiated.
• Domestic politicisation of foreign policy: National leaders in neighbours will use anti-Delhi positions domestically to bolster legitimacy — a dangerous feedback loop that normalises distancing from India.
• Geopolitical openings for rivals: China and other extra-regional actors will exploit any Indian heavy-handedness to deepen economic and security ties.

All of these trends make South Asia less predictable and more susceptible to outside influence.

7.6) The reputational dimension: cultural projection, coercion narratives, and the “India threat” story

Beyond formal diplomacy, soft power shifts matter. Reports of Indian majoritarian rhetoric and policy measures at home travel fast across borders and are refracted through local histories of domination, autonomy movements, and minority sensitivities. Where Indian cultural outreach appears to become a vector for nationalist ideas or where diasporic activism abroad fuels local tensions, neighbours interpret these signals as long-term intent rather than ephemeral domestic politics.

This reputational erosion — the idea of an “India threat” — is asymmetric: it is cheaper for neighbours to adjust policy and court alternatives than for India to reconstruct decades of trust.

7.7) Policy options for Delhi — how to defuse anxiety (practical, sequenced)

confidence measures

Crisis hotlines. Establish 24/7 diplomatic channels and military-to-military hotlines to defuse incidents quickly and avoid escalation.

Diplomatic reassurance tour. Senior Indian ministers should undertake visible, high-profile visits to Kathmandu, Dhaka and Colombo with clear deliverables (trade facilitation, visa easing, immediate development pledges) to signal benign intent.

Freeze provocative steps. Pause unilateral map changes, high-visibility infrastructure openings in disputed border areas, and any coercive trade measures that can be misread as punishment.

8. Putting it together: three plausible scenarios for India’s near-term future

Below are three scenarios (Best, Likely, Worst) for the next 5–10 years. Each is plausible; policy choices, economic performance, and the state’s handling of internal dissent make the difference.

Scenario A — “Managed Transition” (Best case; conditional)

What must occur: India pursues credible economic reforms focused on job creation (labour-intensive manufacturing and services), strengthens targeted social protection, and the central government re-commits to institutional impartiality (courts, police, regulators). The BJP moderates rhetorical excesses; the RSS’s hard edges are restrained in practice. New Delhi balances foreign policy pragmatism with measured public diplomacy that reassures Muslim-majority neighbours and global partners.

Outcome: Economic growth becomes more inclusive; social tensions diminish; international image improves. India consolidates as a major power that still has internal challenges but governs them competently.

Probability: Low to medium — the political cost of such moderation is high and requires elite consensus.

Scenario B — “Strategic Great Power with Domestic Friction” (Most likely)

What must occur: India continues to deepen strategic ties with major powers (U.S., Russia, Israel, and increasingly China at times), pursues selective economic liberalisation and infrastructure builds, but allows a persistent level of majoritarian politics. Social tensions continue but are intermittently contained with security measures. Separatist violence remains limited but recurring (e.g., sporadic violence in Kashmir/NE). Diaspora tensions produce occasional international headlines.

Outcome: India increases its geostrategic footprint but at the cost of eroding soft power and heightened international criticism on human-rights grounds. The domestic compact frays intermittently but is held together by growth and coercion.

Probability: Medium–high — this path preserves power projection while tolerating internal friction.

Scenario C — “Fragmentation & International Isolation” (Worst case)

What must occur: Economic slowdown, major communal conflagrations, aggressive state responses, deepening alienation of minorities, and assertive regional responses (e.g., neighbour countries seeking outside protection). Internationally, India’s perceived bias in contentious conflicts (e.g., unconditional symmetry with Israel in humanitarian crises) causes significant reputational damage; Western partners restrain cooperation, and EU/Global South voices distance themselves. Separatist movements gain momentum in multiple regions.

Outcome: Domestic instability escalates; India’s international capital is depleted; regional rivals exploit the vacuum; foreign investment flows decline; and the country faces long years of rebuilding political trust.

Probability: Low but non-negligible — a dangerous tail risk, especially if a major economic shock or political crisis triggers cascading failures.

9. Policy prescriptions: stabilising the domestic front and repairing international standing

If India’s leaders wished to maximise the country’s long-term power while reducing domestic risk, these practical priorities should be central:

Domestic governance and social compact

1. Jobs first: Prioritise job-creating industrial policy — targeted incentives for labour-intensive manufacturing, logistics, and MSME support — to absorb the demographic bulge. Employment stability reduces susceptibility to communal mobilisation.
2. Strengthen rule of law: Reaffirm independence of key institutions (courts, election commission, police oversight) with transparent reform steps and genuine prosecutions of partisan abuses.
3. Inclusive social protection: Expand targeted cash transfers, universal basic services in health and education, and anti-poverty programmes — not as charity but as investments in human capital.
4. Local conflict resolution: Design autonomy packages and devolution measures for restive regions (Ladakh, Northeast) — meaningful institutional voices for local concerns reduces separatist appeal.

Domestic politics and rhetoric

5. De-escalate public rhetoric: State leadership should discourage inflammatory language; political competition can proceed without dehumanising whole communities.
6. Diaspora engagement strategy: Encourage diaspora cultural outreach that emphasises pluralism and counters hardline exports; work with host governments to reduce local tensions.

Foreign policy and global credibility

7. Calibrated diplomacy: Maintain strategic partnerships while practising soft diplomacy to reassure Muslim-majority states and the Global South — on humanitarian issues, India should appear empathetic and neutral, not reflexively partisan.
8. Public diplomacy investments: Fund cultural diplomacy, transparent human-rights dialogue, and engagement in international development projects that build reciprocity.
9. Multilateral re-anchoring: Use India’s G20 and UN roles to lead issue-based coalitions (climate adaptation, development finance) that rebuild moral capital.

10. What external actors can and should do

External powers seeking stable India as a partner (U.S., EU, Japan, Gulf states) should balance strategic engagement with principled pressure:

• Selective leverage: Tie high-end cooperation (technology transfer, defence deals) to benchmarks on rule-of-law and minority protections — not as punishment but as assurances of mutual reliability.
• Constructive engagement: Offer support for job-creation programs, regional development and institution-building — areas where external finance and know-how can have immediate stabilising effects.
• Avoid zero-sum pressure: External actors should avoid policies that push India into counterproductive nationalist postures; public diplomacy should highlight shared interests while being candid about rights concerns.

11. Final assessment: India’s future is strategic and fragile

India stands at a consequential inflection point. It possesses many of the attributes of a modern great power — market size, technology clusters, nuclear deterrent, diplomatic footprint — but its true strength will be determined by how it addresses the domestic contradictions. A great power that governs internally by exclusion and coercion risks losing the soft power and legitimacy needed to sustain external partnerships. Conversely, if India can convert demographic potential into productive employment, protect pluralism, and show humility in foreign policy, it will be durable, not just large.

India’s diaspora remains an invaluable asset — remittances, talent, and networks are real strategic advantages. But the export of nationalist narratives and partisan politics has turned parts of the diaspora into potential vulnerabilities. Left unchecked, these trends will erode India’s soft power precisely where it matters most: among host publics, investors, and democratic audiences.

The remedy is practical, not purely rhetorical: depoliticised cultural engagement, transparent funding, proactive embassy mediation, stronger host-country community resilience, and responsible diaspora leadership. If implemented, these measures can restore the diaspora as a bridge that enhances India’s global standing rather than a pressure point that weakens it.

India’s rise will be constrained as much by its neighbourhood as by great-power competition. If Delhi treats neighbours as objects of influence rather than partners with legitimate agency, it will pay in reduced strategic depth, lost economic opportunities, and more contested regional diplomacy. The safer strategic choice is humility: combine reassurance with rapid, tangible economic offers and institutional mechanisms that remove bilateral disputes from domestic political theatre.

The alternative is a more polarised subcontinent in which smaller states stitch together survival strategies that increasingly exclude India from the very strategic space it seeks to lead. That outcome would be profoundly counterproductive for India’s long-term security and economic ambitions.

Policymakers in Delhi — and partners in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, and the Gulf — must choose strategies that link material development to political inclusion. The alternative is a nation that looks powerful on maps and military balance sheets but is brittle at its core.

Key sources & further reading

• World Bank, India Poverty and Equity Brief, April 2025. World Bank
• Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: India. Human Rights Watch
• Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: India. Freedom House
• Reuters and AP reporting on recent unrest in Ladakh (September 2025). AP News+1
• Amnesty International, country reporting on civic space and demolitions. Amnesty International
• Lowy Institute and academic analyses on separatist movements in India. Lowy Institute+1